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At the end of 2025, Venezuela is experiencing the deepest political crisis since the arrival of Chavismo, characterized by an unprecedented convergence of internal and external pressures that have essentially “checkmated” the viability of the authoritarian status quo. Nicolás Maduro’s regime faces a triple challenge: an insurmountable legitimacy crisis following the July 28, 2024 elections, a socioeconomic collapse affecting the majority of the population, and U.S. military pressure that has escalated from traditional sanctions to active kinetic operations in the Caribbean.
The question dominating the international political landscape is how long Maduro can hold onto power and under what conditions an exit—which seems imminent—might occur. We will examine the determining factors, the likely scenarios, and the prospects for Venezuelans and the international community.
The Legitimacy Crisis: Disregard for the Popular Mandate
The presidential elections of July 28, 2024, are at the epicenter of the current crisis. The National Electoral Council (CNE) proclaimed Nicolás Maduro the winner with 51.2% of the votes, without presenting disaggregated results table by table, a practice that had traditionally been respected. The opposition, led by María Corina Machado, published 83.5% of the tally sheets collected by its witnesses, which demonstrated a decisive victory for Edmundo González Urrutia with approximately 70% of the votes.
The Carter Center, which acted as an electoral observer at the CNE’s invitation, concluded that the elections “did not meet parameters and international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic.” The UN International Independent Fact-Finding Mission has since documented a systematic pattern of post-election repression that, according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), reaches the threshold of state terrorism practices.
Citizen and International Rejection
Polls conducted between the end of 2024 and early 2025 reveal an overwhelming social consensus about the government’s illegitimacy. According to the UCAB Center for Political Studies, 91.6% of Venezuelans believe Edmundo González was the true winner of the election, while 83.3% disagreed with Maduro’s inauguration on January 10, 2025. Distrust of the CNE reaches 85.82%, and personal distrust of Maduro is 87.5%.
Internationally, the European Parliament recognized González Urrutia as “the legitimate and democratically elected president” in September 2024. The United States, first under Biden and then under Trump, formally recognized González as “president-elect.” Spain’s Congress also approved his recognition, although Pedro Sánchez’s government abstained from following this line.
Maduro’s Inauguration and the New Phase of Conflict
On January 10, 2025, Nicolás Maduro was sworn in as president for the 2025-2031 term before the National Assembly, controlled by Chavismo, in a ceremony held more than an hour before the scheduled time. Edmundo González, who had promised to return to Venezuela to assume the presidency, could not fulfill his announcement. María Corina Machado explained that the regime had closed Venezuelan airspace and activated its air defense system, making the opposition candidate’s safe entry impossible.
Since then, the opposition entered a new stage of clandestine resistance. Machado has remained in hiding in Venezuela for over a year, facing constant threats from the regime. González, in exile in Spain, has continued his diplomatic work, receiving recognition such as the Sakharov Prize from the European Parliament (2024) and the Milton Friedman Prize (2025).
On October 10, 2025, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded María Corina Machado the Nobel Peace Prize “for her tireless work in promoting the democratic rights of the Venezuelan people and her struggle for a just and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy.” This international recognition symbolically strengthened the position of the democratic opposition.
The Current Situation: Repression, Political Prisoners, and Humanitarian Crisis
The NGO Foro Penal currently documents 887 political prisoners in Venezuela, including 117 women, 174 military personnel, and 4 teenagers. According to other consulted sources, these figures actually fall short of reality. Since the 2024 elections, there have been 18,591 arrests, with 16 deaths in state custody. Among those detained are 85 foreign citizens, including 19 Spaniards (15 with dual nationality), 21 Colombians, and citizens from Argentina, Italy, Portugal, and other countries.
The UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission has warned that “persecution for political reasons is intensifying” and that the only hope of justice for the victims rests with the international community. In May 2025, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that “the detention and forced disappearance of critics of the Venezuelan government continues, fueling a climate of fear.”
Venezuela is at the center of the largest forced displacement crisis in the Americas and one of the most severe in the world. According to data from the R4V Platform and UNHCR, approximately 7.9 million Venezuelans currently reside outside the country as refugees or migrants. It is projected that almost one million more could emigrate by the end of 2025, according to the Social Sciences Laboratory (LACSO).
Poverty affects 86.9% of the population, while more than 73% of Venezuelan households earn less than $250 per month. The collapse of public services, shortage of medicines and food, and the widespread decline in living conditions continue to drive Venezuelans out of the country.
The Escalation of International Pressure: The U.S. and Military Deployment
The Trump administration has implemented a radical shift in U.S. policy toward Venezuela, moving from a strategy based exclusively on sanctions to active military operations in the Caribbean. In order to combat drug trafficking, the United States has deployed an unprecedented military force in the region:
- The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, the largest and most advanced in the world, accompanied by destroyers and submarines
- Approximately 20,000 troops in the Caribbean, including special operations groups
- F-35 fighters, B-52, and B-1B long-range bombers
- 186 Tomahawk cruise missiles, more than those used to overthrow Gaddafi in Libya in 2011
The Cartel of the Suns and the Terrorist Designation
On November 24, 2025, the U.S. State Department formally designated the Cartel of the Suns as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). According to Washington, this criminal structure comprises the military and government elite, with Nicolás Maduro at the helm. This classification opens the door to more forceful punitive measures and reinforces the pressure strategy on Caracas.
As expected, the Venezuelan government rejected the designation, calling it an “invention” to justify an illegitimate intervention. Foreign Minister Yván Gil accused Washington of seeking regime change to control the country’s oil resources.
The Trump-Maduro Call: A Rejected Ultimatum
According to Reuters and other sources, on November 21, 2025, Donald Trump held a phone call with Nicolás Maduro, offering him an ultimatum: leave Venezuela within one week in exchange for freely choosing his destination country.
Maduro allegedly responded with conditions that Trump rejected:
- Total amnesty for himself and his family
- Dismissal of charges before the International Criminal Court
- Lifting of sanctions against more than 100 Venezuelan officials
- An interim government led by Vice President Delcy Rodríguez before new elections
When the deadline expired on November 28, Trump declared Venezuelan airspace “closed” and intensified the military deployment. Maduro’s government requested another call with Trump, but significant disagreements persist.
Russia: Reinforced Strategic Partnership
In October 2025, Nicolás Maduro enacted the Law Approving the Strategic Association and Cooperation Treaty between Venezuela and Russia, formalizing an agreement signed in Moscow in May 2025. The treaty expands cooperation in energy, mining, transportation, security, and defense.
President Putin has reiterated his support for Maduro, affirming that Russia will continue the “close joint work” to strengthen strategic partnership relations. During the 19th Meeting of the High-Level Intergovernmental Commission (November 2025), 42 cooperation agreements were signed, including military strengthening.
China: Support Against Sanctions
China has publicly declared its support for Venezuela against U.S. sanctions, opposing any “interference in internal affairs.” President Xi Jinping has stated that China will continue supporting Maduro to “safeguard Venezuela’s sovereignty and national security.”
However, international analysts note that both Russia and China face limitations in their capacity to provide effective support. Russia prioritizes the conflict in Ukraine, which consumes military and diplomatic resources, while China maintains a pragmatic stance that avoids direct confrontation with Washington.
The Venezuelan Economy: Between Official Growth and Real Precarity
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) projected that Venezuela will experience the highest economic growth in South America in 2025, with a 6% GDP increase, well above the regional average of 2.4%. The Central Bank of Venezuela reported a 6.6% GDP growth in the first half of 2025, with a 12.3% expansion in the oil sector.
The Maduro government, as expected, celebrated these figures, attributing them to the “Bolivarian Economic Agenda” and 18 consecutive quarters of growth. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez highlighted that Venezuela “is building a new sovereign economic model.” But nothing could be further from reality: ECLAC’s projections are fundamentally sustained by structural and conjunctural factors beyond the Maduro regime’s management.
The percentage growth is misleading because it starts from an extraordinarily low base. Between 2014 and 2020, Venezuela lost approximately 80% of its GDP, a contraction greater than that of any country in peacetime in modern history. GDP alone fell 25.5% in 2019 and 30% in 2020. To this must be added U.S. oil licenses and remittances received from exiled Venezuelans.
These macroeconomic indicators contrast dramatically with the daily reality of the population. The UNDP report for the first half of 2025 notes that annualized inflation reached 216.7%, tied to exchange rate devaluation and uncertainty factors linked to international sanctions. The official exchange rate rose from 216 to 258.80 bolivars per dollar in the last week of October 2025.
83.4% of Venezuelans rate their economic situation as “bad” or “very bad.” The gap between the official and parallel dollar consistently exceeds 40%, accelerating inflation and eroding the purchasing power of those dependent on bolivar-denominated incomes.
Future Scenarios: When and How Might Maduro Leave?
Experts from the Center for Political Studies at Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (Politika UCAB) identify three main scenarios for Venezuela’s short-term future:
Scenario 1: Authoritarian Stalemate (Decreasing Probability)
The regime maintains control through coercion and normalizes low-intensity conflict with the United States. However, this scenario is considered increasingly unviable due to:
- Unsustainable economic spending to maintain currency stability
- Growing political and economic costs from U.S. pressure
- Erosion of internal legitimacy
Scenario 2: Democratic Transition (Medium Probability)
This scenario has two paths:
- Negotiated Exit: Guarantees to the ruling elite (amnesty, asset protection, personal security) in exchange for a peaceful transition. This option would require participation from international mediators (Brazil, European countries) and recognition of the 2024 electoral results.
- Internal Fracture: A split at the top of the power structure caused by the unsustainable cost of loyalty to Maduro. María Corina Machado has insisted that internal fractures are “inevitable” under current pressure.
Scenario 3: Limited Kinetic Incident (High Probability Catalyst)
A targeted U.S. military attack (air, maritime, or limited ground action) that does not seek occupation but aims to accelerate a change in the cost-benefit calculation for Venezuela’s elite, precipitating an internal rupture or forcing serious negotiation.
The specialized literature warns that democratic transition processes do not automatically guarantee stable democracies. Venezuela faces specific structural obstacles:
- The Cuban Factor: U.S. officials have noted that “Cuban controllers” might execute Maduro if he yields to pressure and resigns.
- The Criminal Network: The intertwining of the state and organized crime makes any exit that does not include impunity guarantees difficult.
- Guerrilla Resistance: The regime has distributed weapons and planned a guerrilla strategy to make the country “ungovernable” in the event of foreign intervention.
Although it is impossible to pinpoint an exact date, the convergence of pressures suggests that Maduro’s regime faces its most vulnerable moment. The failed Trump call and intensification of the military buildup indicate that Washington seeks a resolution in the short term (weeks or a few months).
However, as some analysts warn, the regime paradoxically depends on external military pressure for internal cohesion, but this same pressure “raises the cost of governing to levels that make its long-term survival unsustainable.” Maduro’s exit could occur through accelerated negotiation under extreme pressure, an internal military rupture, or a collapse triggered by a catalytic incident.
What Venezuelans and the World Can Expect in the Short Term (6-12 months)
- Intensification of International Pressure: The U.S. will likely maintain or increase its military deployment and economic sanctions.
- Possible Discreet Negotiations: Communication channels between Washington and Caracas could explore conditions for a negotiated exit.
- Continuation of Repression: The regime will maintain political persecution and social control as a survival strategy.
- Additional Economic Deterioration: Sanctions and political uncertainty will affect investment and consumption.
And in the Medium Term (1-3 years)
- Possible Transition Scenario: If external pressures successfully fragment the Chavista power coalition, an opportunity could arise for an orderly, negotiated transition.
- Risk of Instability: An abrupt departure by Maduro without clear transitional structures could create power vacuums and internal conflicts.
- Reconstruction Challenges: Any post-Maduro government will face the monumental task of rebuilding institutions, restoring public services, and reintegrating millions of emigrants.
Regional and Global Implications
- Migration Crisis: Escalating instability could trigger new waves of migration to Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and other countries in the region.
- Oil Market: Venezuela possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves; any transition will affect global energy markets.
- Geopolitical Precedent: Venezuela’s outcome will set a precedent for the effectiveness of international pressure and limited interventions against authoritarian regimes.
We can say that Venezuela is on a knife’s edge, trapped between a regime that lost legitimacy long ago—if it ever had any—but maintains coercive control of the state, and an opposition recognized internationally but unable to materialize the 2024 electoral mandate. The convergence of internal economic crisis, U.S. military pressure, and diplomatic isolation has drastically reduced the viability of the status quo.
Maduro’s departure is not a question of “if,” but “when” and “how.” Current conditions suggest that the outcome could occur within weeks or months, not years, though the specific form (negotiation, internal fracture, or external catalyst) remains uncertain. What is clear is that any path to resolving the Venezuelan crisis will inevitably be complex and high-risk.
For Venezuelans, the immediate future promises more turbulence—unfortunately necessary—before any stabilization. For the international community, the Venezuelan case is a crucial test of democracies’ ability to support peaceful transitions and prevent humanitarian crises. The responsibility to accompany Venezuela toward a democratic exit rests not only on local actors but on the entire community of nations committed to human rights and democracy.
